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UNREGENERATE DOINGS: 
SELFLESSNESS AND SELFISHNESS IN 
NEW DIVINITY THEOLOGY 
WILLIAM BREITENBACH 
University of Puget Sound 
ELIJAH PARISH WAS PLAYING POLONIUS. THE CONGREGATIONAL MINISTER OF 
Byfield, Massachusetts, admonished his son to consider the "vast impor- 
tance" of sound preaching when he chose his place of residence. For his part, 
the elder Parish solemnly declared, he "would rather sit under the most 
ordinary preacher, than attend a minister of wrong principles, possessing the 
most profound genius and the most powerful eloquence."' 
His fatherly advice seems unobjectionable enough. Yet Reverend Parish 
was a Hopkinsian, a proponent of the theological system set forth by Samuel 
Hopkins, the disciple of Jonathan Edwards. The Hopkinsian (or New Divin- 
ity) theologians, who flourished in New England during the second half of 
the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, were 
infamous for their belief that sinners could perform no acceptable duty, not 
even in such actions as praying or Bible reading. Why then should Parish 
concern himself about the quality of the preaching that people heard, when 
he and his fellow New Divinity ministers claimed that the unconverted did 
nothing but sin when they heard it? 
To their critics, the Hopkinsians' proposition seemed to encourage sinners 
to "neglect or abuse ... the prescribed means of grace."2 To Ezra Stiles, the 
"uncouth, venemous & blasphemous" idea implied that an "Unconverted 
Man had better be killing his father & mother than praying for convertlinig 
'William B. Sprague, comp. and ed., Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative 
Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of Various Denominations, from the Early 
Settlement of the Country to the Close of the Year Eighteen hundred andfifty-five (New York: 
Robert Carter and Brothers, 1859), II, 271. 
2Moses Hemmenway, Seven Sermons, on the Obligation and Encouragement of the 
Unregenerate, to Labour for the Meat which Endureth to Everlasting Life (Boston: Kneeland 
and Adams, 1767), 196. 
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Grace."3 Luckily, opponents noted, New Divinity preachers like Parish had a 
way of ignoring the obnoxious doctrine in their own lives. They compelled 
their wicked children to pray and rejoiced when their dissolute neighbors 
flocked to public worship. Yet even though the Hopkinsians partially re- 
deemed their imperfect principles by their inconsistent practice, their adver- 
saries warned that they professed an offensive doctrine: it seemed unevan- 
gelical at best and anarchical at worst to deny the value of sinners' best 
efforts. 
The New Divinity position on unregenerate doings has been much criti- 
cized and little understood. The doctrine emerged during the mid-eighteenth 
century in response to the challenges facing New England Calvinism. By the 
1740s and 1750s Arminians, both Anglican and Congregational, were attack- 
ing the "arbitrary" tenets of Calvinism, in particular the idea that God 
bestowed saving grace without any reference to the endeavors of the uncon- 
verted. Accusing Calvinists of preaching a creed that debilitated morality, 
Arminian critics maintained that God gave grace to sinners who strove for it. 
Calvinists responded with explanations of how God administered his 
conditional covenant with men. They agreed with the Arminians that the 
Scriptures contained promises, that it was the duty of sinners to seek grace in 
the use of means, that saving grace was ordinarily dispensed through means, 
that sinners had encouragements in their strivings, and that these encourage- 
ments increased in proportion to the sinners' diligence. Yet the Calvinists 
parted ways with the Arminians on the question of whether there were 
promises of special grace made upon condition of unregenerate ndeavors. 
True, God's covenant of grace was a conditional one, but the promise was 
that God would save those who had faith in Christ, and that faith was a free 
and gracious gift of God, not a reward for human effort. Sinners could not 
earn justification by their own righteousness, for there was no moral excel- 
lency in their works. 
Still, because they did not want cutthroats and fornicators defending 
wickedness by spouting the doctrine of free grace, Calvinists carefully 
explained that their theology did not "cut the Sinew" of sinners' efforts. For 
one thing, duties like prayer were "materially good" though they had no 
"formal Goodness" or "true Morality." For another thing, the encourage- 
ments under which the unregenerate labored provided strong motives for 
exertion. Nudging the idea of encouragement until it teetered on the brink of 
becoming a promise, Calvinists persuaded themselves "that not a single 
Instance will be found of any Sinner in the Day of Judgment able to stand 
3Ezra Stiles, The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, D.D., LL.D., ed. Franklin Bowditch Dexter 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901), II, 505, 115. 
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forth, and plead in Truth, Lord, I did my best Endeavour to the very last ... 
but after all was deny'd."4 
The ticklish problem facing the Calvinists was to preach free grace with- 
out provoking immorality. They found their task complicated by the injudi- 
cious zeal of some of their Calvinist brethren. In New England, the Great 
Awakening was generally interpreted by its supporters as a divine vindication 
of those who preached the doctrine of justification by faith in its Calvinistic 
purity. Yet the Great Awakening had also hatched some extreme New Lights, 
bellicose sectarians like Andrew Croswell and James Davenport, who so 
exalted Christ's imputed righteousness and so vilified man's polluted works 
that they seemed intent upon resurrecting the antinomianism of Anne 
Hutchinson's day. 
These New England extremists were part of a broader reactionary move- 
ment within eighteenth-century Calvinism, which responded to the Enlight- 
enment by proclaiming increasingly antinomian positions on the doctrine of 
justification. Participants in this movement shared a conviction that the 
preservation of Calvinism rested on a repudiation of any hint of works 
righteousness. They complained that many of the orthodox did not ade- 
quately emphasize the sufficiency of Christ. They warned against substitut- 
ing a reliance on human activity or the means of grace for faith in Christ. 
Thus, the extreme New Lights of New England could draw upon (and 
reprint) the works of intellectually respectable British theologians of an 
"antinomian" cast: Walter Marshall, Thomas Boston, Ralph Erskine, Ebene- 
zer Erskine, Robert Sandeman, William Cudworth, and James Hervey. 
By the early 1760s New England mainstream or "Old" Calvinists were 
doubly beleaguered. On the one flank were the Arminians, attacking them 
for making too little of morality and for promoting fatalism and licentious- 
ness. On the other flank, antinomian enthusiasts assailed them for mongreliz- 
ing doctrine and for making too many concessions to human works. The Old 
Calvinists' problems were just beginning, for in 1765 Samuel Hopkins 
published his Enquiry concerning the Promises of the Gospel; Whether any 
of them are made to the exercises and doings of persons in an Unregenerate 
State.5 Thereafter the Old Calvinists were triply beleaguered. 
Hopkin's point was simple enough. He responded to the Arminians by 
stating flatly that before regeneration everything done by a sinner was totally 
4Jedidiah Mills, A Vindication of Gospel-Truth, and Refutation of some dangerous Errors, In 
Relation to that important Question, Whether there be Promises of the Bestowment of special 
Grace, made in Scripture to the Unregenerate, on Condition of any Endeavours, Strivings, or 
Doings of theirs whatsoever? (Boston: Rogers and Fowle, 1747), 75, 45, 77. 
'Hopkins's Enquiry may be found in his Works of Samuel Hopkins, D.D. (Boston: Doctrinal 
Tract and Book Society, 1852), III. 
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wicked and unacceptable to God. Moreover, while the sinner remained 
unregenerate, he more he used the means of grace, the more he aggravated 
his guilt. Yet Hopkins was not just another antinomian reactionary. Infact, 
his arguments contained an implicit attack on antinomian passivity. He 
claimed that sinners had an ability to perform God's commands. Accord- 
ingly, the unconverted were to be exhorted to immediate repentance. 
Hopkin's formulation managed to offend just about everyone who had 
previously considered the matter. The immediate consequence of his publi- 
cation was a paper war-fiercest in the 1760s and 1770s, but warmly pressed 
well into the nineteenth century-that created and consolidated the New 
Divinity party. The ultimate consequence was the transformation of Calvin- 
ist theology and religious experience in New England. 
* * * 
The inspiration for Hopkins's New Divinity came from Jonathan Ed- 
wards's treatise on the will. Edwards's aim in that work had been to demon- 
strate "that God's moral government over mankind, his treating them as 
moral agents ... is not inconsistent with adetermining disposal of all events." 
He set out to prove, in short, that one could be voluntary and accountable, 
even though acting under necessity. 
Edwards began by stating that every volition of the will (which he also 
called the heart) expressed an inclination, preference, ordesire of the person 
doing the choosing. A person never willed contrary to the prevailing inclina- 
tion of his soul: he never chose what he did not prefer, and he preferred and 
chose that which appeared to be the greatest good. Thus the will could be 
said to be determined by the strongest motive, the strength of which arose 
from a combination of subjective and objective circumstances. 
Edwards then analyzed the meaning of liberty, which he characterized asa 
person's power to do as he pleased. A man was free if he was under no 
physical "hindrance or impediment inthe way of doing, or conducting in any 
respect, as he wills." Accordingly, all voluntary acts were by definition 
unquestionably free. Nor was a person's liberty affected by any consideration 
of what caused him to choose to do as he did. It was enough that the choice 
was voluntary. 
To this explanation of the workings of the will, Edwards applied a distinc- 
tion between two kinds of necessity-natural necessity and moral necessity. 
Natural necessity referred to "such necessity as men are under through the 
force of natural causes." An event naturally necessary would occur in spite 
of the choices or preferences of a person's will. Natural necessity thus 
involved some physical hindrance to voluntary action. Since something 
extrinsic to the will deprived the individual of liberty to act voluntarily, he
was excused from accountability for that event. 
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But there was another kind of necessity that did not excuse. Edwards 
defined moral necessity as the certainty that arose from the potency of 
"moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral 
motives and inducements." Whereas natural necessity connected natural, 
involuntary causes and effects, moral necessity connected moral, voluntary 
ones. Nevertheless, Edwards insisted, moral necessity could be every bit as 
absolute as natural necessity. 
Unlike natural necessity, however, moral necessity did not overpower the 
will. Edwards observed that no "opposition, or contrary will and endeavor, is 
supposable in the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the 
inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to 
oppose and resist it."6 One Edwardsean drew the distinction between the two 
necessities in this manner: "If I should put you out of my house in spite of 
every effort you could make to oppose me, because I was the strongest man, I 
should say you went out by a natural necessity; - but if you went out of your 
own free choice, the event would prove there was a moral necessity, though 
you acted with an entire freedom; and in this case, there is no natural 
necessity."7 
As the example indicates, moral necessity was in no way incompatible 
with liberty as Edwards had defined it. Under natural necessity, a person had 
a physical inability to act as he pleased, but under moral necessity, his 
inability was nothing more than his disinclination to do something. Moral 
inability was a "will not" so strong that it became a "cannot." Of course, such 
unwillingness neither deprived the individual of his freedom to act voluntar- 
ily nor nullified his accountable moral agency. 
Edwards's argument allowed him to preserve necessity without impairing 
liberty. Since the Fall, man had a habitual preference for sin. He had a moral 
inability to be holy because he lacked any inclination to choose the good. Yet 
despite this morally necessary depravity, he was a free agent, possessed of all 
the liberty he could possibly enjoy. After all, he was voluntary in his sinful- 
ness: he loved it, preferred it, and chose it. 
Edwards gave Calvinists grounds for exhorting sinners and grounds for 
blaming them. Sinners were naturally able to do their duty, if only they were 
willing to do it. The problem, of course, was that they always preferred to sin. 
Still, the moral necessity of their sin did not excuse sinners from blame. 
Since their inability was unwillingness, the greater their inability-that is, 
the stronger their disinclination-the more culpable they were. Yet their 
voluntary unwillingness to be holy was so fixed, so intransigent, so obdurate, 
6Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (1754; rpt. New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1957), 431, 163, 156, 156-57, 159. 
'Connecticut Evangelical Magazine, 4 (1803-1804), 285. 
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that only God's free grace was powerful enough to change it. By showing that 
human behavior could be voluntary but still necessary, Edwards was able to 
prove that sinners were at once accountable moral agents and depraved 
creatures desperately in need of God's sovereign grace. 
Samuel Hopkins and the other New Divinity preachers made Edwards's 
distinction between moral and natural necessity the shibboleth of their tribe. 
Yet they also slightly modified his interpretation of free agency. Instead of 
describing the liberty requisite to accountable agency as being a person's 
power to do as he pleased, the Hopkinsians represented it as a person's power 
to be voluntary in his willing. By "internalizing" Edwards's definition of 
liberty, they more firmly secured free agency. "Every exercise of the will in 
choosing or refusing is the exercise of freedom," asserted Samuel Hopkins, 
"and it is impossible for a man to will and choose without exercising moral 
liberty."8 Yet the internalization also meant that Edwards's disciples had to 
abandon his relatively unified model of psychology. Rather than saying that 
man was free, they said that the will or heart was free. In effect, they moved 
the battleground between moral and natural necessity from the frontier 
where the mind touched the physical world into the interior of the mind or 
soul itself. No longer just a border struggle with the corporeal, the problem 
of free agency also became a civil war between the faculties of the mind. 
Since the will was where the voluntary preferences and choices occurred, 
it was the only voluntary and therefore the only moral faculty in the human 
soul. Seating moral qualities exclusively in the will meant, of course, that all 
other powers and capacities of the soul, including understanding and con- 
science, were natural rather than moral in character. It followed that the 
damage resulting from the Fall touched only the heart. If any other power or 
capacity of the soul had sustained injury, the sinner's inability to be holy 
would be excusable because it would be natural and not exclusively volun- 
tary. New Divinity ministers would not admit that "human depravity lies in 
the least degree, in any real or imaginary destruction" of the intellect 
because they held depravity to be a "moral, and not a natural, disorder."9 
Hence, they confined depravity to the will and affirmed that "the Undstdg. of 
Adam after his Fall was as good, & equal to what it was in a State of 
Innocency."'0 
In this matter, the Hopkinsians clashed with the Old Calvinists, who 
maintained that depravity afflicted not just the heart or will but all faculties, 
8Frank Hugh Foster, "The Eschatology of the New England Divines," Bibliotheca Sacra, 43 
(1886), 717. 
9Ebenezer Bradford, Strictures on the Remarks of Dr Samuel Langdon, on the Leading 
Sentiments in the Rev. Dr. Hopkins'System of Doctrines (Boston: I. Thomas and E. T. Andrews, 
1794), 18. 
'0The quote is a critical comment by Ezra Stiles, taken from his Extracts from the Itineraries 
and Other Miscellanies of Ezra Stiles, D.D., LL.D., 1755-1794, ed. Franklin Bowditch Dexter 
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1916), 364, 412. 
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including the understanding. As intellectualists, the Old Calvinists criticized 
their opponents for inflating the importance of the will by making it the 
governing and only moral faculty. It seemed to them that if the will were not 
under "the direction and government of the understanding," man was no 
longer a "rational and moral agent."" Old Calvinists believed that man was a 
moral agent because he was a cause by counsel whose understanding judged 
the good according to the motives presented to it and whose will then moved 
the soul to embrace that good. Hence Old Calvinists had two objections to 
the New Divinity scheme. First, in denying that moral concerns had anything 
to do with the understanding, the scheme subverted man's agency as a 
rational creature, in effect reducing men to animals and making God the 
author of sin. From this perspective, the Hopkinsians appeared to be hyper- 
Calvinists. Second, in asserting that sin was nothing more than voluntary 
disinclination or unwillingness, the scheme implied that a gracious change 
was not needed for salvation. From this perspective, the New Divinity 
ministers appeared to be Arminians. 2 
For their part, the Hopkinsians argued that the Old Calvinists placed the 
sinner under an excusable, natural inability to perform his duty. By denying 
that sin was disinclination and by maintaining that the natural faculty of the 
understanding was depraved, the Old Calvinists burdened the sinner with "a 
cannot, independent of a will not."'3 Yet it was impossible, said Samuel 
Hopkins, to make a person feel blameworthy or accountable for a "cannot." 
The consequence of the Old Calvinist doctrine was to cast all the blame for 
sin back on Adam, which was a notion "most sweet to many a corrupt 
heart."'14 The New Divinity preachers warned that this kind of Calvinism 
would drive the religious folk to Arminianism and leave only the vicious 
behind to fill the churches. 
Since they had different explanations of depravity, New Divinity and Old 
Calvinist ministers naturally had different explanations of how God went 
about saving sinners. Because the Old Calvinists assumed that sinfulness was 
not simply the total depravity of the heart but rather the universal depravity 
of all the faculties, they contended that there had to be a divine operation on 
both the intellect and the will. First the Spirit illuminated the understanding 
with a divine light, which enabled the person to see Christ as a suitable and 
all-sufficient Savior. This enlightenment was not by mere moral suasion. 
"Samuel Langdon, Remarks on the Leading Sentiments in the Rev 'd Dr Hopkins' System of 
Doctrines (Exeter, N.H.: Henry Ranlet, 1794), 24. My argument here has been greatly influ- 
enced by Norman S. Fiering's "Will and Intellect in the New England Mind," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 29 (1972), 515-58, which suggests that the divisions among Calvinists during the 
Great Awakening continued earlier divisions between Puritan intellectualists and voluntarists. 
12Moses Hemmenway, Remarks on the Rev. Mr Hopkins's Answer to a Tract Intitled 'A 
Vindication of the Power, Obligation and Encouragement of the Unregenerate to Attend the 
Means of Grace, " &c. (Boston: J. Kneeland, 1774), 137. 
13Hopkins, Works, I 509. 
14Ibid., III, 299. 
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Sinners did not regenerate themselves imply by listening to ministers preach 
the Word. The Spirit had to work internally with the truth, quickening it with 
an efficacious influence. After presenting the Savior in a proper light to the 
understanding, the Spirit renovated the will by inclining it to "desire and 
embrace that which the Understanding judgeth to be good."'5 
Instead of the term "regeneration," Old Calvinists preferred "effectual 
calling," the phrase sanctioned by the Westminster Confession. Calling 
implied "inviting, and effectually persuading the sinners," so it left room for 
the play of the human understanding in the great change.16 Because Old 
Calvinists explained effectual calling as both an enlightenment of the under- 
standing and a renovation of the will, they placed great importance on the 
means of grace. Since the Spirit used the means when it quickened the truth, 
the sinner's hope lay in attending upon them. There was further encourage- 
ment for sinners in the fact that the understanding, unlike the will, was not a 
disjunctive faculty. True, there was no real faith until the Spirit invigorated 
the Word, but on the other hand, the knowledge of truth might grow so 
gradually that it would be difficult o determine "at what point of time the 
principle of spiritual ife was first infused."'17 Moreover, there was abundant 
reason to conclude that those who strove would "receive further influences 
and assistances ... whereby they may become more and more prepared for 
the reception and exercise of the divine life, and so advance gradually 
towards the kingdom of God."'8 
Since there was a higher probability of mercy for the diligent, reformed 
sinner than for the indifferent, secure sinner, it was obviously a duty to be 
diligent and reformed. Sinners had the option to use or abuse the advantages 
presented them by common grace. They could attend public worship or 
guzzle in the tavern. Who could doubt which was better? Old Calvinists used 
the distinction between reformed and profligate sinners to argue that there 
were commanded duties that the unregenerate could perform acceptably 
before they received saving grace. Even though such unregenerate duties 
were not holy, even though they were selfish and misguided attempts to buy 
salvation, there was "a less degree of true moral evil in the conscientious 
performance of them, than in the contemptuous neglect of them."'19 
The best actions of the unregenerate were good in some respects, though 
'5Thomas Foxcroft, Like precious Faith obtained, through the Righteousness of our God and 
Saviour, by all the true Servants of Christ (Boston: Green and Russell, 1756), 31. 
'6Ezra Stiles Ely, A Contrast between Calvinism and Hopkinsianism (New York: S. Whiting, 
1811), 128. 
'7Hemmenway, Seven Sermons, 162. 
'8Ibid., 106. 
'9Jedidiah Mills, An Inquiry concerning the State of the Unregenerate under the Gospel (New 
Haven: B. Mecom, 1767), 101. 
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not as good as they should be. A reformed sinner was like a child who sullenly 
obeyed his father's order to go to school. The father had not commanded the 
sulking-indeed, he hated it-but the child did better to go in a snit than not 
at all. Besides, the child who went crankily might eventually go cheerfully, 
but only if he continued to go. To a certain extent, the Old Calvinist position 
on unregenerate doings blurred the line between sinners and saints by 
declaring that the former could perform some acceptable duties. Although 
not Arminians, the Old Calvinists flirted with preparationism because they 
feared that if sinners were told that they could do no duty, they would do 
nothing at all. Old Calvinists ought to insure that the unregenerate, instead 
of being as bad as they might be, might be as good as they could be while 
awaiting God's grace.20 
The New Divinity ministers demanded not only that God's disobedient 
children go to school but that they go with smiles on their faces. Samuel 
Hopkins and company had a very different explanation of regeneration. 
Assuming that the heart or will was the only seat of depravity, they con- 
cluded that that faculty alone needed renovation. According to them, regen- 
eration was a divine operation that turned the heart so that it loved and chose 
holiness. The will was a disjunctive faculty: it chose either sinfulness or 
holiness. Before regeneration it chose the former; after regeneration, the 
latter. Thus, there was an essential difference between the regenerate and the 
unregenerate. Hopkinsians had no room in their system for any vague, 
neutral status that was better than profanity but not quite so good as piety. 
Sinners performed no partial good or acceptable duty when they busied 
themselves with the means of grace. True, they enlightened their understand- 
ings with doctrinal truths, but the understanding was a natural faculty, not a 
moral one, so no amount of intellectual ight could make a sinner holy. So 
long as he remained unconverted, an enlightened, Bible-reading sinner was 
no better than an ax-murderer.2" 
201t is important o stress that preaching "preparationism" did not make the Old Calvinists 
Arminians, or even crypto-Arminians. Ifanything, the aim of their doctrine was to guarantee 
moral behavior without succumbing to the Arminian error. Old Calvinists saw themselves as 
mediating between the Arminians, who made "too much of the sinner's seeking to God, in the 
diligent use of the means, as though there was in it something that is holy and spiritual," and the 
hyper-Calvinists, who made "too little of it, as tho' because it was not holy, or connected with 
promises; therefore it was quite nothing at all." See Mills, Inquiry, 73n. 
2The New Divinity position is set forth in the following places: Hopkins, Works, 1, 367-69; III, 
217; Bradford, Strictures on the Remarks, 25; Nathan Strong, Sermons on Various Subjects, 
Doctrinal, Experimental and Practical (Hartford: Oliver D. and I. Cooke, 1798-1800), I, 130; 
Charles Backus, The Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration Considered, in Six Discourses (Hartford: 
Hudson and Goodwin, 1800), 21-22; Joseph Bellamy. The Works of Joseph Bellamy D.D., ed. 
Tryon Edwards (Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, 1850), I, 49; Jonathan Edwards, Jr., 
The Works of Jonathan Edwards, D.D., ed. Tryon Edwards (Andover, Mass.: Allen, Morrill and 
Wardwell, 1842), I, 481-92. 
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In the opinion of the New Divinity ministers, the Old Calvinist position 
was untenable. Hopkinsians alleged that the Old Calvinist emphasis on the 
illumination of the understanding was a thinly disguised Arminianism. If 
truth turned a person from sin to holiness, depravity was only misunderstand- 
ing or intellectual error, for which the remedy was not divine regeneration 
but better information. On this supposition, Hopkins observed, the most 
depraved sinner needed nothing for conversion "but that light and convic- 
tion of conscience which shall bring these things into clear view."22 Nor need 
this light necessarily come from God, whose only advantage over an elo- 
quent minister or a nagging spouse was that he could "use arguments with 
more dexterity."23 If regeneration was illumination, conversion was, as admit- 
ted Arminians professed it to be, a matter of moral suasion and self-improve- 
ment. 
Of course, when irritated Old Calvinists pointed out that a divine illumina- 
tion involved more than just persuasive arguments, the Hopkinsians reviled 
them as antinomians. If the notion of some kind of special divine illumina- 
tion meant anything at all, it had to mean that the understanding needed 
some alteration before the sinner could become holy. Yet that implied a 
natural inability-an implication that "men by nature have not sufficient 
capacity or faculty of understanding to know their duty."24 As regeneration 
would then be equivalent to giving an idiot his reason by a miracle, 
Hopkinsians challenged those "that hold to regeneration by light ... to show 
how men are wholly to blame for continuing in a state of unregeneracy, or 
that this is any crime at all."25 
Similarly indefensible was the Old Calvinist position on unregenerate 
doings. If the Old Calvinists asserted that sinners who used the means of 
grace did some acceptable duty that earned them salvation, they slid into the 
Arminian ditch. In effect, they compounded with sinners by conceding that 
the unconverted differed only in degree from the converted. On the other 
hand, if Old Calvinists insisted on the gap between preparatory activity and 
effectual calling, they seemed guilty of encouraging an antinomian passivity. 
In effect, they told sinners that they could only come to the side of the 
healing pool and lie around waiting in the hope of drowning in a flash flood of 
divine grace-waiting, that is, until the Spirit operated with power on the 
means of grace. 
The grave danger that the Hopkinsians detected in the Old Calvinist 
theology was its unevangelical tendency. Telling a sinner that he could and 
22Hopkins, Works, III, 103. 
23Nathanael Whitaker, Two Sermons: On the Doctrine of Reconciliation (Salem, Mass.: 
Samuel Hall, 1770), 71-72. 
24Edwards, Jr., Works, II, 111. 
2'Hopkins, Works, III, 107. 
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should perform some partial duties while still remaining a sinner implied that 
he lay under "an inability to repent and embrace the gospel, which does, in 
some degree at least, excuse him from not repenting immediately."26 The Old 
Calvinist notion of unregenerate duties encouraged complacency in sinners. 
It gave them ease short of Christ. It permitted them to remain sinners, while 
they attended the means of grace and pretended to wait for God's time. 
New Divinity ministers demolished this cozy refuge by denying that unre- 
generate doings were in any way acceptable. Indeed, these theologians 
sometimes argued that the sinner grew worse under means because he 
sinned against greater light: his heart continued impenitent even as his 
intellect was stocked with more knowledge and truth.27 By disclaiming the 
value of the best actions of the unregenerate, Hopkinsians exposed them- 
selves to the charge of being hyper-Calvinists, a charge that has tarnished 
their reputation from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. Of course, 
New Divinity ministers did not confiscate the Bibles of their unconverted 
parishioners. The Hopkinsian preachers did not tell sinners not to use the 
means of grace, but neither did they tell them that it was all right to use the 
means sinfully. Sinners who sowed tares should not expect to harvest any- 
thing but tares. Nor should they presume that sowing tares relieved them of 
the obligation to sow wheat. 
The Hopkinsians could deny the value of unregenerate doings because 
they had so fully established the natural ability of sinners to repent and be 
holy. Since the unregenerate were under no natural necessity to sin, and 
since the only obstacle to their acceptable obedience was their voluntary 
unwillingness to obey, they should be pressed to immediate repentance. No 
unregenerate doings could possibly be acceptable because none came up to 
the true gospel duty, which God commanded and which the sinner had the 
natural ability to perform. 
The problem with Old Calvinism was that it soothed and settled people in 
their status as sinners by giving them the idea that "the use of means is the 
whole duty to which they are now obligated."28 The New Divinity renuncia- 
tion of unregenerate doings was (and still is) criticized for pulling the rug 
from under human activity in the process of conversion, but in fact the 
intention was quite the opposite. Hopkinsians alleged that it was the Old 
Calvinists who impugned human ability: that was why Old Calvinist preach- 
ers permitted the sinner to piddle his life away in an unavailing round of 
external duties. The Hopkinsians, on the other hand, could urge sinners "to 
commence Christians immediately, and without delay" precisely because 
26Ibid., I, 502; Joseph Washburn, Sermons on Practical Subjects (Hartford: Lincoln and 
Gleason, 1807), 309. 
27Hopkins, Works, III, 263. 
28Edwards, Jr., Works, II, 113-14. 
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they believed that sinners had the natural ability to cease sinning whenever 
they chose to do so.29 New Divinity preaching was vigorously evangelical; its 
constant refrain was the demand for immediate repentance. 
* * * 
New Divinity theology was a response to the complaints of Arminians that 
Calvinism subverted people's sense of moral accountability. Hopkinsians 
sought to fashion a more defensible Calvinism, one that securely established 
moral agency without surrendering the characteristic Calvinist doctrines of 
divine sovereignty. Their solution to the problem enabled them to assume 
extreme positions on both freedom and necessity. They came into conflict 
with the Old Calvinists because the latter's doctrines eemed to leave Calvin- 
ism too vulnerable to the Arminian attack: Old Calvinism, when it remained 
Calvinistic, seemed dangerously antinomian. 
Hopkinsians perceived this tendency as particularly evident in the Old 
Calvinist explanation of justifying faith. Justification was the divine action 
by which God ceased to consider a believer as being under the condemna- 
tion of the law. According to Calvinist theology, a person who was united to 
Christ by faith had the benefits of Christ's righteousness imputed to him. It 
was for this imputed righteousness that God justified him. Then, after 
justification changed the person's legal status, sanctification changed the 
person himself.30 
The root of the difference between the Old Calvinists' and the Hopkinsians' 
interpretations of justification lay in their dissimilar theories of human 
psychology. Old Calvinists defined a moral agent as a creature whose will 
moved'him according to the dictates of his understanding. Hence, when Old 
Calvinists described the act of justifying faith, they characterized it as a 
powerful belief in the mercy of God promised through Christ, a belief that 
moved the will to embrace that promise as the greatest good. 
To Hopkinsians, this definition of saving faith seemed to imply a selfish 
kind of religion. First the understanding perceived the value of Christ as a 
mediator for sinners, and only then did the will choose to accept Christ as 
Savior. Hopkinsians feared that if the Old Calvinists made saving faith into a 
decision to come to Christ for life, they were not far from the antinomians' 
notion of "faith of assurance," which was an individual's unswerving belief 
29Massachusetts Missionary Magazine, 1 (1803-1804), 260. This periodical was strongly 
Hopkinsian. 
30The best account of the Puritan explanation of conversion is in William K. B. Stoever, 'A 
Faire and Easie Way to Heaven ". Covenant Theology and Antinomianism in Early Massachu- 
setts (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1978). 
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that Christ would save him. Although New Divinity ministers considered 
selfishness to be the essence of sin, Old Calvinists saw no reason to set 
holiness at odds with a desire for salvation. Old Calvinists assumed that since 
faith was a belief in God's mercy to sinners, there was no particular cause to 
rebuke people's natural self-love as sinful or selfish. Once the understanding 
was enlightened in effectual calling, it was entirely appropriate that self-love 
direct the believer back to God.31 
As Hopkinsians began to think about it, they concluded that the Old 
Calvinists' morphology of conversion was wrong. The notion that faith (or 
intellectual belief) preceded, and was the ground of, holy love of God 
resulted in an unacceptably selfish and antinomian type of religion. Such a 
notion supposed that "a sinner is pardoned, and has a covenant title to 
eternal life, while unrenewed, as well as while impenitent."32 There was then 
no need for a change of heart; the unregenerate did not have to stop loving 
sin to be saved. After all, it required no change of heart in a sinner to love a 
God who proposed to save him from hell. The greatest enemy to God could 
do as much, just as a murderer, without ever repenting his crime, could love 
the judge who set him free. The Old Calvinists' doctrine of saving faith 
seemed unavoidably to weaken the authority of the moral law. 
The New Divinity ministers, who believed that the will was the only moral 
faculty, could offer a description of justification that did not undermine the 
law. They began with the assumption that regeneration changed the heart or 
will from a love of sinfulness to a love of holiness. Since regeneration 
preceded justification, this meant that some holy volition or love preceded 
pardon. In saying this, the Hopkinsians began to move beyond Puritan 
standards, for they were asserting not merely that people performed a 
condition or qualification for justification (i.e., an act of faith) but that that 
performance was an act of personal, inherent holiness. The logic of their 
theory of the will eventually led the New Divinity theologians to alter the 
Puritans' normal order or morphology of conversion. Only after the regener- 
ated heart exercised love of God could a person unselfishly believe in Christ 
unto salvation. Hence, the Hopkinsians rearranged the stages of conversion 
into the following order: regeneration, love of God, evangelical repentance, 
faith, justification, adoption, sanctification, and glorification. In this way 
they insured that saints would love God for what he was rather than out of 
gratitude for pardon. 
3"See William Hart, Brief Remarks on a Number of False Propositions, and Dangerous Errors, 
which are Spreading in the Country (New London, Conn.: Timothy Green, 1769), 58; and Ely,A 
Contrast, 219-20. 
32John Smalley, Sermons, on Various Subjects, Doctrinal and Practical (Middletown, Conn.: 
Hart and Lincoln, 1814), 377. 
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The Old Calvinists, who believed that justifying faith must precede holy 
exercises, protested this new ordering. "If a man may be regenerate & holy 
some Minutes and hours before the Exercise of Faith," they reasoned, why 
might he not "be months &c. and even regenerated and go to hell at last?"33 
The Hopkinsians ignored this possibility because their principal concern 
was to demonstrate that there had to be inherent holiness before pardon. 
Nathanael Emmons, the most unflinching of the theological school, even 
went so far as to proclaim that "sanctification is before justification and the 
only proper evidence of it."34 
The point was to eliminate any vestiges of antinomianism from Calvinism 
by showing that holiness was as much required under the gospel as under the 
law. The Old Calvinist order of conversion seemed to cheapen the law by 
implying that Christ came to relieve sinners from its demands. If people were 
justified without holiness, they were justified as sinners; but to justify sinners 
was to void the law. By requiring an inherent holiness before justification, the 
New Divinity theologians established the honor of the law and the accounta- 
bility of sinners under it, whereas "those who place faith before love and 
repentance, make all religion selfish."35 
The Hopkinsians were careful to stipulate that people were not justified 
for their inherent holiness. For one thing, personal holiness could not atone 
for an individual's past sins. Holiness of heart did not merit but only received 
a salvation merited by Christ. These theologians were not Arminians. Still, 
they were able to repel many of the Arminian attacks on Calvinism by 
showing that love came before justification, holy acts before the title to 
salvation, and the law before the gospel. 
The phrase "willing to be damned" has haunted New Divinity theology 
from the beginning. Critics have always pointed to it as the most preposter- 
ous article of an exceedingly preposterous creed. The idea makes sense, 
though, when seen in terms of the Hopkinsian explanation of conversion. 
The Old Calvinists, who placed holy love after faith and justification, im- 
plied that God pardoned sinners who did not love him. New Divinity theolo- 
gians, who saw regeneration as a change of heart and who believed that love 
preceded justification, assumed that sinners must love God before he 
pardoned them. Nathanael Emmons drew the conclusion: "If God does not 
love sinners before they love him, then they must love him, while they know 
33Stiles, Literary Diary, 1, 139; Stiles, Itineraries, 472-73. 
34Nathanael Emmons, The Works of Nathanael Emmons, D.D., ed. Jacob Ide (Boston: 
Crocker and Brewster, 1842), V, 163. 
35Ibid.; also see Bellamy, Works, II, 209n, 222; John Smalley, Sermons, on a Number of 
Connected Subjects (Hartford, Conn.: Lincoln and Gleason, 1803),344-45; and Jacob Catlin,A 
Compendium of the System of Divine Truth, 2nd ed. (Middletown, Conn.: E. and H. Clark, 
1826), 152-53. 
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that he hates them, and is disposed to punish them for ever."36 In short, they 
must love a damning God. 
Hopkinsians declared that the regenerate must love God and the law 
before they could exercise faith, which was love of Christ and the gospel. 
The love of the law, known as evangelical repentance and experienced as 
unconditional submission, was the very opposite of the selfish concern for 
personal salvation permitted by the doctrines of the Old Calvinists and the 
antinomians. The regenerate heart loved the law because the law punished 
sin. Since a regenerate person delighted in the application of the law to 
others, he perforce delighted in the application of it to himself. The New 
Divinity convert would not cease to approve of the law even if he believed 
"that God designed, for his own glory and the general good, to cast him into 
endless destruction."37 
The idea of unconditional submission carried with it a fundamental irony 
that relieved it of much of its apparent harshness. As this love of the law was a 
regenerate xercise, those who performed it would never feel the torments of 
hell. A willingness to be damned was not a habitual exercise of the saint; 
rather, it was a misapprehension arising out of an initial failure to realize that 
regeneration had occurred. Since a person "cannot know that he loves God 
till he has this disposition, which is necessarily implied in love to God, he 
does not know that it is not necessary for the glory of God that he should be 
damned."38 
The intention was to repudiate antinomianism by affirming that pardon 
followed holiness. More fundamentally, it was to demonstrate that the under- 
standing lagged behind rather than dictated to the will. Consequently, the 
apprehension of the meaning of the change could only occur in the subse- 
quent intellectual reflection upon the change. The antinomian faith of 
assurance, a selfish persuasion of one's own salvation, could never be the 
germ of true holiness. 
The convert's innocent and cordial resignation to the divine will proved 
that his heart was fixed on God and not on his own desire for heaven. An 
un-self-conscious submission demonstrated that the convert was not "bribed 
into acquiescence."39 Yet most important, unconditional submission repre- 
sented a commitment o the authority of the moral law during the experience 
of conversion. "The true believer," said Samuel Hopkins, "prizes holiness 
more than assurance, and is more concerned to obtain the former than the 
36Emmons, Works, VI, 465. 
37Hopkins, Works, I, 389. 
38Ibid., III, 148. 
39Gardiner Spring, Memoir of Samuel John Mills, 2nd ed. (New York: Saxton and Miles, 
1842), 8. 
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latter.... Indeed, the true Christian ... is seeking more important objects 
and events than his own salvation."40 
Hopkinsians recognized that selfish religion overthrew the authority of 
the law. Selfish religion did not require holiness or obedience, either before 
or after justification. It set gospel against law and declared that Christ came 
into the world to mitigate the rigor of the requirements placed on sinners. 
Both Arminians and antinomians were guilty of preaching selfish religion. 
Both pandered to the sinner's desire to be saved without having to change his 
sinful heart. Both blurred the sharpness of the distinctions between saint and 
sinner, holiness and sinfulness, and good and evil. 
New Divinity ministers wanted to preserve the authority of the law. They 
insisted that conversion not abate it by allowing sinners to be pardoned while 
their hearts remained wicked. Hopkinsians recognized that it was impossible 
to speak of an absolute difference between good and evil if human beings out 
of their own sinful natures were able to attain holiness, for that would mean 
that good was not the contradiction of evil but only an improved version of it. 
Only the necessity of a divine act transforming man from sin to holiness 
could insure the strict opposition of good and evil that moral order seemed 
to require. On the other hand, if sinners had no ability of their own to attain 
holiness, it was unfair to require it of them, and they were not accountable 
for their sin. If sinners lacked ability, the absolute distinction between good 
and evil was fundamentally irrelevant o their lives, for mankind did not live 
in a state of probation. In this case, as much as the other, moral order seemed 
impossible. The New Divinity theology allowed ministers to thread a path 
between these unacceptable alternatives. A gracious conversion sustained 
the absolute distinction between good and evil, but in a way that did not 
excuse sinners from responsibility for their sins. Thus, New Divinity theol- 
ogy provided a guarantee of the possibility of moral order in a society of 
sinners. 
* * * 
In the past two decades historians of eighteenth-century New England 
have told us much about what life was like in a society of sinners. Many of 
these historians have told a tale of disintegration and fragmentation.41 They 
4OHopkins, Works, I, 533. 
41Some of the relevant studies are the following: Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, Salem 
Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974); Richard 
D. Brown, Modernization: The Transformation of American Life, 1600-1865 (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1976); Richard L. Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social 
Order in Connecticut, 1690-1795 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); Edward Cook, "Social 
Behavior and Changing Values in Dedham, Massachusetts, 1700-1775," William and Mary 
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have described homogeneous, organic, cohesive communities which, though 
not collectivistic in organization, displayed a premodern, communal spirit. 
People who lived in these towns subordinated their individual self-interest to
the good of the group, and rough parity of circumstances and prospects 
contributed to social harmony. Self-denial rested on a sense of shared fate. 
Consensual authority was possible because the community, through its town 
government, dispensed benefits to all as needed. The people farmed for a 
living, but they aimed no higher than a competence for themselves and 
security for their families. They valued goods according to standards of 
usefulness, as measured by the customary just price, and they traded for 
these goods in kind. They had little contact with the world outside their 
town, so their dealings were with people whom they knew well in all their 
social roles. There was a continuity to their experience, and their children's 
lives were like their own. 
Then, historians have reported, came disruptive change. Population 
grew and towns found themselves without enough land for the rising 
generation. Once the common land had been distributed, children had to 
endure longer periods of dependency, at the end of which they received 
smaller benefits. Land shortage and soil depletion forced some youths into 
trades and others out of town. Control of the available land by some families 
cut off the avenue of opportunity for others. The result was social 
stratification-fixed istinctions within the community between rich and 
poor. These distinctions revealed themselves not only in the ownership of 
land but also in such things as the possession of luxury goods and the seating 
assignments in the church. 
These changes began to corrode the townsfolk's sense of common purpose. 
Communities tasted the sourness of contention as town meetings became 
occasions of strident competition for access to privileges and limited 
resources. The fragmentation took literal form as towns divided into pre- 
cincts and parishes to accommodate the needs and desires of particular 
groups. Instead of self-denial, people began to exhibit the more "modern' 
qualities of self-interest and individualism. 
Farmers shifted from subsistence to commercial agriculture, but raising 
cattle and crops to sell for profit meant the end of customary prices and 
Quarterly, 27 (1970), 546-80; Bruce C. Daniels, The Connecticut Town: Growth and 
Development, 1635-1790 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1979); Charles S. Grant, 
Democracy in the Connecticut Frontier Town of Kent (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961); 
Philip J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, 
Massachusetts (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970); Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and their 
World (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town, The 
First Hundred Years: Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); and 
Patricia J. Tracy, Jonathan Edwards, Pastor: Religion and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
Northampton (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980). 
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barter exchange. Entrance into a market economy required that the value of 
goods be set in money, for money was divisible and thus capable of adjusting 
to changes in supply and demand. The commercial system replaced use 
valuation with exchange valuation, thus substituting flexible prices for just 
ones. Flexible prices meant competition and competition meant social 
atomization, as individuals pursued their own interests. Seeking prosperity 
instead of merely a competence, people took risks to maximize their profits, 
for they no longer had any standard of objective value except money. 
The competition stimulated by the market economy subverted the basis 
for consensual authority. Individuals brooked no restraints of their pursuit of 
self-interest. They insisted on the importance of personal liberty, and the 
legal system obliged them by changing from standards of prescription to ones 
of proscription, from enjoining duties to prohibiting crimes. As people grew 
independent of communal values, their relations with others became con- 
tractual and impersonal, shaped by competition, calculation, and self- 
assertion. The individual stood isolated, sharply defined against others. 
These historians have not told a cheery story. Recently, however, other 
historians have begun to reexamine the process of social change in New 
England.42 They have noted that modernization involves not just a change in 
the economic structure of society but also a cultural change to a new 
mentality that values calculation and self-interest. They have argued that 
people had to learn to be individualistic. New Englanders who did not 
possess this modern mentality felt the market economy and its competitive, 
entrepreneurial behavior to be an alien and dislocating intrusion into their 
lives. This second group of historians accordingly has stressed the resistance 
that New Englanders offered to change: their reluctance to enter the com- 
mercial system, their continued commitment o consensus, their disinclina- 
tion to exploit opportunities to the fullest. These historians have pointed to 
the cultural continuities in architecture, agriculture, crafts, folk tales, and 
songs. They have remarked on the lengths to which New Englanders went to 
preserve their stable, conservative, rural communities. They have noted, for 
example, that when land grew short, people tried to keep the community's 
42Some of the relevant studies are the following: Christopher Clark, "Household Economy, 
Market Exchange and the Rise of Capitalism in the Connecticut Valley, 1800-1860," Journal of 
Social History, 13 (1979), 169-89; James A. Henretta, "Families and Farms: Mentalite in 
Pre-Industrial America," William and Mary Quarterly, 35 (1978), 3-32; Christopher M. Jedrey, 
The World of John Cleveland: Family and Community in Eighteenth-Century New England 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1979); John J. Waters, Jr., "Patrimony, Succession, and Social 
Stability: Guilford, Connecticut in the Eighteenth Century," Perspectives in American History, 
10 (1976), 131-60; and Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kingdoms: New England Towns in the 
Eighteenth Century (New York: Knopf, 1970). An important work that studies New York rather 
than New England is William J. McLaughlin, "Dutch Rural New York: Community, Economy, 
and Family in Colonial Flatbush," Diss. Columbia Univ. 1981. 
Selflessness and Selfishness 497 
distribution of wealth relatively stable by leaving their farms to one child and 
establishing the others in new towns on the frontier. As long as a premodern 
mentality remained strong, social change met resistance. 
These two interpretations of New England social history might not be as 
far apart as they at first seem. Both recognize that before New England 
society could become fully modern there had to be a restructuring of 
consciousness and cultural values. The second interpretation stresses the 
resistance to change and the persistence of the older attitudes. Yet the first 
interpretation implies much the same thing in its frequent references to the 
tension between individualistic behavior and communitarian values, an 
anxiety-inducing tension that is seen as erupting in such diverse therapeutic 
explosions as witch hunts, ministerial dismissions, revivals, and even revolu- 
tionary wars. 
Both interpretations imply that people change their values only reluc- 
tantly and at some cost. Both propose that from the perspective of older 
values, individualism seemed anarchical. They also suggest that changes in 
behavior required a change in people's knowledge about moral existence -a 
change, that is, in people's understanding of what was proper and improper, 
virtuous and vicious, good and evil. New Englanders needed a new set of 
values, a new ethic, a new theology, to fit them for a new kind of behavior. 
The problem they faced was to convince themselves that self-interest and 
individualism would not inevitably produce a chaotic and lawless society. 
Only a confidence in the idea of self-interest could make it possible to 
conceptualize behavior in a new way. Consider, for example, the kind of 
impersonal relations arising out of the desire to turn a profit. In contractual 
transactions, people took risks by dealing with strangers. Yet the competitive 
nature of the market made these exchanges seem hostile rather than mutu- 
ally beneficial. For these transactions to proceed with confidence, there had 
to be some certainty that individuals would keep their selfishness within 
limits and that they would honor their contracts even when it was no longer 
to their advantage to do so. 
In short, individualism required certain generally accepted restraints on 
self-interest. Before rural New Englanders could experiment with individual- 
istic behavior, they needed to believe that all self-interested individuals 
subscribed to universal rules about right and wrong, according to which 
competition could proceed in an orderly and predictable way. Those who 
were just entering a market economy wanted to know that there were 
absolute standards of right and wrong, and that the strangers with whom they 
dealt recognized those standards. 
If New Englanders encountered the market economy with anxiety and 
trepidation, it is hardly surprising. There could be no guarantees that self- 
interested individuals might not retail their rectitude as they did their cattle: 
hold it until the market was high, then dump it. After people grew accus- 
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tomed to the ways of the market, they might relax their vigilance and admit 
that self-interest policed itself. Initially, however, only an explicit affirmation 
of the existence of absolute standards of virtue could embolden people to 
behave in new and rash ways. The new mentality of commercialism had to 
emerge out of the old mentality of communalism. New Englanders had to 
transform a sense of common purpose in a community into a sense of 
common allegiance to absolute and universal moral principles. Their ability 
to accomplish this feat helps explain why the region with the strongest 
communal tradition was to become renowned for its commercial sharpness.43 
* * * 
Theology is not peripheral to social experience.44 Taking the word in its 
largest sense, theology is the knowledge that people have of the universe they 
inhabit. By assigning meaning and value, theology delineates the kinds of 
experience available or possible to a people in a given society. It sets forth the 
assumptions and rules under which an activity is considered to have been 
done properly or improperly; that is, to be right or wrong. Thus, theology is 
one of the things that makes it possible for people to live together in 
societies. 
Social experience must have meaning conferred upon it. Theology medi- 
ates between experience in the world and the understanding of that experi- 
ence in the mind. The relation between theology and social experience is, 
however, neither simple nor unilinear; rather, it is reciprocal, allowing for a 
continuing, mutually influential dialogue. Theology and social experience 
strive for equilibrium, each moving to accommodate changes in the other, so 
that experience remains meaningful and the reality confronting people 
makes sense. 
43My thinking on these matters has been greatly influenced by the following works: Joyce 
Appleby, "Ideology and Theory: The Tension between Political and Economic Liberalism in 
Seventeenth-Century England," American Historical Review, 81 (1976), 499-15; Appleby, 
"Locke, Liberalism and the Natural Law of Money," Past and Present, no.71 (May 1976), 43-69; 
Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. 
Press, 1978); Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (New Haven: Yale 
Univ. Press, 1975); J. E. Crowley, This Sheba, Self: The Conceptualizationpf Economic Life in 
Eighteenth-Century America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974); Joseph R. Gusfield, 
Community: A Critical Response (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Karen Lee Halttunen, 
"Confidence Men and Painted Women: The Problem of Hypocrisy in Sentimental America, 
1830-1870," Diss. Yale Univ. 1979; Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: 
Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977); 
and Richard I. Rabinowitz, "Soul, Character, and Personality: The Transformation of Personal 
Religious Experience in New England, 1790-1860," Diss. Harvard Univ. 1977. 
44The following four paragraphs summarize the interpretation found in Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966). 
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From one perspective, theology is an independently existing body of 
theory that proceeds according to its own logical inner dynamic of argument 
and counterargument. The resulting changes in theology, by revising the 
explanation of reality, open new possibilities for behavior in the world. A 
person encounters a world with the lines of meaning and value redrawn, and 
so he can act in different ways. When this happens, theological change has 
altered social experience. From another perspective, changes in social expe- 
rience compel adjustments in theology. If theology failed to come to terms 
with social change, it would abrogate its responsibility to explain reality. 
People would feel anxiety as their behavior came to seem meaningless and 
anarchical instead of meaningful, predictable, and proper. Therefore, theol- 
ogy must change in response to alterations in social experience. 
The question of which change comes first is perhaps unanswerable, for we 
always encounter the world in medias res. It is worth noting, though, that in 
its adjustments a theology always attempts to retain its integrity as a system- 
atic body of theory. In other words, theologies try to remain consistent. What 
this means is that as much as possible people use the old and familiar to make 
sense of the new and unfamiliar. In one sense, this theological conservatism 
restrains or limits change, but in another sense it makes change tolerable and 
therefore possible. 
Historians who have considered the social implications of New Divinity 
theology have generally concluded that it was a conservative, rural insurrec- 
tion against transformations inthe New England social order.45 An archaic 
theology of austere Calvinism, we have been told, appealed to the agricul- 
tural temperament. Hopkinsian ministers, many of them farm boys uprooted 
by demographic and economic changes, turned their resentment against an 
emerging acquisitive, individualistic style of behavior. The rural folk 
who filled their churches were receptive to a gospel dedicated to preserving 
the traditional social values of self-restraint and general concord. 
To advance their social goals, the Hopkinsian ministers preached energeti- 
cally on the need for sacrificing self-interest tothe greater general good. By 
45This interpretation ismost fully set forth in Joseph Anthony Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and 
the New Divinity Movement: Calvinism, the Congregational Ministry, and Reform in New 
England between the Great Awakenings (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1981). 
See also Stephen E. Berk, Calvinism versus Democracy: Timothy Dwight and the Origins of 
American Evangelical Orthodoxy (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1974); Richard D. Birdsall, 
"Ezra Stiles versus the New Divinity Men," American Quarterly, 17 (1965), 248-58; Birdsall, 
"The Second Great Awakening and the New England Social Order," Church History, 39 (1970), 
345-64; Joseph A. Conforti, "Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity: Theology, Ethics, and 
Social Reform in Eighteenth-Century New England," William and Mary Quarterly, 34 (1977), 
572-89; Robert L. Ferm, A Colonial Pastor: Jonathan Edwards the Younger, 1745-1801 (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1976); and Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolu- 
tion considered as an Intellectual Movement," in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Morton White, 
eds., Paths of American Thought (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963). 
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defining sin as selfishness and holiness as universal disinterested benevo- 
lence, the New Divinity preachers denied that there could be any acceptable 
self-love short of universal ove. By refusing to draw a distinction between 
legitimate self-love and illegitimate selfishness, they rebuked all individualis- 
tic behavior as sinful. The demand that converts willingly submit to damna- 
tion for the glory of God is pointed to as the ultimate expression of the 
Hopkinsians' commitment to selflessness. Given this insistence that the 
individual subordinate his own interest o the general good, the New Divinity 
theology should be viewed as a resistance movement, retarding the arrival of 
an atomistic, egoistical commercial order. 
The usual interpretation isnot entirely correct. Hopkinsian theology was 
more than just a reactionary defense of the traditional social ethic against 
the threat of individualistic behavior. Instead, it contributed to the creation 
of a new mentality, one that permitted New Englanders to venture into 
market relations with something approaching confidence. This confidence 
required three things initially. First, there had to be an affirmation that there 
were universal and absolute standards of right and wrong. Second, there had 
to be a renunciation of all forms of self-interest that threatened to reduce the 
social order to anarchy. Third, there had to be a new way to conceive of 
self-interest so that it would seem legitimate, limited, and orderly. New 
Divinity theology met all three of these demands. 
First, New Divinity theology upheld the absolute distinction between good 
and evil. Indeed, the principal goal of the Hopkinsians was the defense of the 
law against critics like the Arminians who charged that it was unfair. The 
New Divinity demonstrated that sinners were justly accountable under the 
law, even though they were necessarily and totally depraved. Devotion to the 
law led the Hopkinsians to deny the value of even the best actions of the 
unregenerate. The same devotion led them to propound an explanation of 
justification that guarded against antinomianism. The willingness to be 
damned, which was an integral part of every New Divinity conversion, was an 
overt, explicit, personal commitment o the authority of the divine law. 
Through their unconditional submission, converts internalized absolute and 
unqualified criteria of virtue and vice. The legalism of the New Divinity 
guaranteed that there would be no compromises with sinners before regenera- 
tion and no cheaper terms for saints after it. The belief in the existence of 
universal moral principles made it possible for rural New Englanders to take 
their first entative steps into the market economy. 
Second, the New Divinity theology condemned those varieties of self- 
interest hat threatened to produce anarchy by weakening the authority of 
the law. Hopkinsians exposed the antinomian implications of the Old 
Calvinistic explanation of justification. New Divinity theologians showed 
that a mercenary faith, which selfishly sought salvation and passively relied 
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on Christ's imputed righteousness, threatened to cloud the difference be- 
tween holiness and sin. In addition, Hopkinsians rebuked as dangerously 
antinomian the Old Calvinist notion that the unregenerate were able to 
perform some acceptable duties. 
Old Calvinists disliked the stark distinction between regeneracy and 
unregeneracy because they feared that it would discourage moral behavior. 
They insisted that the sinner had some duties to discharge even though God 
had not yet converted him. Their concern was to show that there was a range 
of moral positions, and that it was better to have sinners behaving themselves 
for bad reasons than not to have them behaving themselves at all. Old 
Calvinists maintained that there could be a kind of secondary virtue arising 
from a self-interested use of the means which was, if not truly holy, at least 
useful for civic morality. This idea made eminent sense in traditional 
communities, where familiarity gave people a pretty good idea which of their 
neighbors were truly and inwardly virtuous and which were not. The idea 
made sense in urban, commercial centers as well, where more extensive 
experience with self-interested behavior made people less apprehensive of 
its anarchical potential and where, accordingly, they were less fussy about 
internal holiness so long as external morality was observed. Yet for rural folk 
just entering into impersonal, contractual market relations with strangers, 
the question of whether to trust a self-interested sinner might seem more 
problematic. What the New Divinity gave these people was a guarantee that 
the distinction between virtue and vice was not blurred but sharp. It prom- 
ised them that there was no fuzziness in moral matters; there was no neutral 
or legitimate self-love standing somewhere between holiness and sin. 
Finally, New Divinity theology made individualism possible by offering a 
nonantinomian concept of self-interest. The famous Hopkinsian definition 
of holiness as universal disinterested benevolence was more than just a 
protest against selfish behavior. New Divinity ministers demanded that be- 
nevolence be impartial and disinterested, not uninterested. Hence they did 
not condemn benevolence directed toward oneself. Samuel Hopkins ob- 
served that a "person who exercises disinterested good will to being in 
general must have a proper and proportionable regard to himself, as he 
belongs to being in general, and is included in it as a necessary part of it." In 
fact, a person had an obligation to exercise his benevolence where it would 
do the most good, especially toward those whose wants were most in his 
sight. Since every person knew his own needs best, "his disinterested, univer- 
sal benevolence, will attend more to his own interest, and he will have more 
and stronger exercises of it, respecting his own circumstances and happiness, 
than those of others, all other things being equal."46 
46Hopkins, Works, I, 240-41, 377-78. 
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Thus, the doctrine of disinterested benevolence made it possible for an 
individual to treat his own interest abstractly. It allowed a person to pursue 
his self-interest by redefining it as a form of disinterested benevolence. In this 
way, Hopkinsianism offered a theoretical justification of self-interest to a 
people who wanted some reassurance that it would not lead to antinomianism 
and social anarchy. The idea of disinterested benevolence permitted 
individualism, but only after categorizing it as duty and after affirming that it 
did not overthrow the absolute distinction between virtue and vice. Behavior 
that in the past could only have been seen as selfish and sinful now could be 
viewed as acceptable and even holy. 
New Divinity theology offered a kind of religious version of Adam Smith's 
idea that an Invisible Hand shaped the greatest general good out of individuals' 
seeking their own interests. Both Samuel Hopkins and Adam Smith provided 
a theoretical egitimation of individualism through the promise that limits 
and laws lurked behind (or within) the pursuit of self-interest. New Divinity 
theology reassured anxious New Englanders that there was a catch in the 
whirling ratchet of selfishness that would stop it from spinning inexorably 
into anarchy. 
New Divinity ministers helped create a mentality fitting New Englanders 
for participation as individualistic entrepreneurs in a market economy. Their 
theology set forth the limits and boundaries that people needed when they 
began to look beyond their familiar surroundings. It helped transform New 
England from a cluster of covenanted communities to a conglomeration of 
converted individuals. It made individualism assimilable by squaring it with 
an absolutistic law. It smoothed the way for acquisitive and egocentric 
behavior, not through the cynical conclusion that society could survive the 
activities of sinful men, but through the optimistic promise that saints would 
respect limits. In sum, it gave rural New Englanders that "perfect law of 
liberty" which they might follow, secure in the Apostle's promise that if they 
did they would be blessed in their deeds.47* 
47James 1:25. 
*Versions of this paper were presented at a colloquium sponsored by the Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, and at the December 1980 meeting of the American Society of 
Church History. I would like to thank the Institute of Early American History and Culture for its 
generous support. 
